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NOTES
Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs In on Extending
American Pipe Tolling in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff
I. Introduction
Class action lawsuits present a variety of challenging issues to the legal
system. Among these is the effect that class actions have on the running of
statutes of limitations. Both statutes of limitations and the class action suit
share the goal of promoting judicial efficiency.1 Yet legal scholars recognize
that because of the large number of plaintiffs—each with an individual cause
of action—joined in a single suit, “class actions and statutes of limitation[s] do
not interact harmoniously.”2 The Supreme Court of the United States first
addressed this often fractious interaction in American Pipe & Construction Co.
v. Utah by formulating the class action tolling doctrine.3 The Court held that
when class certification is denied, “the commencement of the original class suit
tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for
class action status.”4 The Court later extended this doctrine to potential

1. Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The Impropriety of Class Action
Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532, 533-34 (1996).
2. Id. at 535.
3. See 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
4. Id. at 553. The Court’s ruling in American Pipe led some circuit courts to conclude that
tolling was only available to plaintiffs who sought to intervene in the pending action after it was
determined that the suit could not proceed as a class action, but did not allow plaintiffs to file
their own individual and independent suits. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 618 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1201 (1983); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977); Arneil
v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 4, § 6, 89 Stat. 97, 104 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f (1970)), as recognized in Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). This interpretation was rejected by the Supreme Court in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v.
Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983). The choice of whether to intervene or file an independent
suit is now merely a procedural or tactical decision. As a procedural consideration, putative
class members may not meet the requirements for intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a). See id. at 350 n.4. They might prefer to file an independent action rather than
risk a denial of permission to intervene under Rule 24(b), which is left to the discretion of the
court. See id. From a tactical standpoint, putative class members may desire to exert the greater
individual control over their cases that only filing an individual lawsuit would provide. See id.
at 350.
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plaintiffs wishing to file independent suits after the denial of class certification.5
But the Court has declined to address whether the rule might apply where a
potential member of a putative class seeks to file an independent lawsuit before
the trial court’s denial or certification of the class.6
The circuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have come to
differing conclusions.7 The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and
Sixth Circuits, the first circuit courts to consider the issue, held that extending
tolling to individual suits filed by putative class members prior to a decision on
class certification was contrary to the goal of judicial efficiency underpinning
the Court’s opinion in American Pipe.8 These circuits observed that judicial
efficiency would be hindered by allowing individual plaintiffs to file
independent but duplicative suits while a class action was pending.9 But more
recently, courts have begun to adopt the view that tolling is appropriate in such
situations.10 Most recently, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Boellstorff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined the
growing trend by determining that class action tolling applies to independent
suits filed before class certification.11
This note argues that the Tenth Circuit was correct in ruling that the class
action tolling doctrine should apply to members of a putative class prior to a
decision on class certification. Under a proper interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s holdings in American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal, combined with the
understanding that a class action suit is a truly representative action in which all
putative class members are parties to the suit (albeit unnamed parties), the
statute of limitations governing all class members’ claims should be understood
as tolled from the commencement of the class action until the denial of
certification. Whether putative members seek to file independent actions after

5. See Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350.
6. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that “members of the plaintiff-class who have filed individual suits are entitled to the
benefits of American Pipe tolling”), cert. denied sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Stanton, 129 S. Ct. 762 (2008).
7. Compare Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 569 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that tolling does not apply to plaintiffs filing suit before class certification is decided),
and Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983) (same), with State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230-35 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that tolling does
apply to such plaintiffs), In re Hanford, 534 F.3d at 996, 1009 (same), and In re WorldCom
Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir. 2007) (same).
8. Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569; Glater, 712 F.2d at 739.
9. See Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569; Glater, 712 F.2d at 739.
10. See, e.g., In re Hanford, 534 F.3d at 996; In re WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 254-56.
11. See 540 F.3d at 1230-35.
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a denial of class certification or prior to a ruling on certification, the timeliness
of these suits should date to the filing of the initial class action.
Part II of this note outlines the development of the class action tolling
doctrine and the reasons behind its development. It also examines the initial
denials to extend tolling to potential class members who seek to file
independent actions prior to class certification. Part III discusses the facts,
issue, and holding of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Boellstorff. Part IV sets forth the Tenth Circuit’s reasons for extending the
tolling doctrine to an individual plaintiff who seeks to leave the class action and
file an independent suit before class certification. Part V examines the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis and argues that the court’s decision properly applied the
reasoning behind the class action tolling doctrine to the circumstance of an
individual case filed prior to class certification. This note concludes in Part VI.
II. The Origin and Development of the Class Action Tolling Doctrine
A. Setting the Stage: The Purposes of Statutes of Limitations
Understanding the class action tolling doctrine first requires an examination
of the basic, underlying purposes of statutes of limitations. “Statutes of
limitation[s] . . . are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”12 Thus,
one purpose of statutes of limitations is to increase judicial efficiency by saving
the courts the difficulty of adjudicating stale claims.13 Statutes of limitations’
primary purpose, however, is to protect defendants from surprise litigation and
the difficulties of defending against stale claims.14
B. The Birth of Class Action Tolling: American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah
In March 1964, a group of individuals and companies were indicted for
conspiring to fix the prices of steel and concrete pipe in violation of the
Sherman Act.15 The defendants entered nolo contendere pleas on June 19,
1964.16 On June 23, 1964, the United States filed civil actions against the same
12. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
13. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also Rhonda
Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA.
L. REV. 803, 811-12 (2006).
14. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers,
321 U.S. at 348-49.
15. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 540 (1974).
16. Id.
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defendants, seeking “to restrain further violations of the Sherman Act and
violations of the Clayton and False Claims Acts.”17 A final judgment regarding
these civil claims was entered against the defendants in May of 1968.18
A year later, the State of Utah filed a civil suit against some of the same
defendants, likewise claiming that they had violated the Sherman Act by
conspiring to fix pipe prices.19 Utah styled this suit as a class action on behalf
of “public bodies and agencies of the state and local government in the State of
Utah who [were] end users of pipe acquired from the defendants,” as well as
similarly situated, unnamed plaintiffs.20 Utah’s proposed class action rested on
15 U.S.C. § 16(b), which at the time provided that
[w]henever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the
antitrust laws, . . . the running of the statute of limitations in respect
of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year
thereafter . . . .21
Utah had filed its proposed class action suit eleven days before the one-year
statute of limitations had run; thus, the district court declared the action
timely.22
Six months later, on December 4, 1969, the district court entered an order
denying class certification on the grounds that the class was not “so numerous
that joinder of all members [was] impracticable,” as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1).23 Eight days after denial of class certification,
“more than 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts in . . . Utah” sought to
intervene as named plaintiffs.24 The district court denied these motions to
intervene as untimely.25 The court held that the initial filing of Utah’s class
action had not tolled the statute of limitations and that the limitations period had
thus run.26 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 541.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 541-42 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1968) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16(i)
(2006))).
22. Id. at 542.
23. Id. at 543.
24. Id. at 543-44.
25. Id. at 544.
26. Id.
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reversed the denial of permissive intervention.27 The court of appeals held that
the initial class action served as the initiation of suit as to all members of the
putative class, and thus the intervenors had filed a timely action.28
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.29
The Court ruled that “where class action status has been denied solely because
of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable,’ the commencement of the original class suit tolls the
running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely
motions to intervene” after denial of class action certification.30 The Court
reasoned that a contrary rule would endanger judicial efficiency, because it
would induce potential class members to file “protective motions to intervene”
for fear that class certification would be denied after the statute of limitations
for an action had run.31 Such a rule would lead to a “needless duplication” of
such motions.32 The Court also noted that its holding did not frustrate the
primary purpose of statutes of limitations.33 Class actions are representative
suits; therefore, the initial filing of the suit provides notice to the defendants and
thereby ensures that they are not required to defend against stale claims or
surprise litigation.34
C. The Extension of Class Action Tolling to Plaintiffs Who File Individual
Suits: Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker
The Supreme Court extended the American Pipe tolling doctrine in Crown,
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, determining that a plaintiff may also take advantage
of class action tolling when filing an individual and independent suit after class

27. Id. at 544-45.
28. See id. at 545.
29. Id. at 539, 561.
30. Id. at 552-53 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)). While the Court’s language seemed
to suggest that tolling would only apply when the class was denied for failing to meet the
numerosity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1), the courts that have since
addressed the question have found that tolling applies after the denial of class certification for
any of the Rule 23(a) requirements. See Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197,
210-11 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Court’s decision in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,
462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983), contained no such limiting language); Smith v. Pennington, 352
F.3d 884, 892 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); Barbieri v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 747, 751 (Cl. Ct.
1988) (holding that the efficiency concerns of American Pipe tolling would be undermined by
limiting tolling to only those situations in which class denial was based on a failure to meet the
numerosity requirement).
31. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553.
32. Id. at 554.
33. See id. at 554-55.
34. See id. at 550, 554-55; see also discussion infra Part V.B-C.
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certification has been denied.35 In July 1977, Theodore Parker filed a claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against his
former employer for racial discrimination.36 The EEOC determined that there
was “no reasonable cause to believe” Mr. Parker’s charge of discrimination and
notified Mr. Parker of its determination by letter issued on November 9, 1978.37
In compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,38 the EEOC’s
letter also notified Mr. Parker of his right to sue under the Civil Rights Act
within ninety days of the notice.39
In the time between Mr. Parker’s filing of a complaint with the EEOC and
the EEOC’s issuance of the decision letter, two other employees of Crown,
Cork & Seal filed a class action suit alleging discrimination.40 They claimed “to
represent a class of black persons who ha[d] been, continue[d] to be and who
in the future [would] be denied equal employment opportunities by
defendant.”41 The court denied class certification over a year later on
September 4, 1980.42 The next month, on October 27—“within 90 days after
the denial of class certification”—Mr. Parker filed an independent suit.43
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted
summary judgment to Crown, Cork & Seal.44 The court held that Mr. Parker’s
action was not timely because he had failed to file within the ninety-day statute
of limitations after receiving notice of his right to sue in 1978.45 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this ruling, holding that
American Pipe class action tolling had taken effect with the filing of the class
action suit in 1978.46
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit and ruled that class action
tolling was available “to all asserted members of the class who would have been
parties” to the suit had certification been granted.47 Thus, after certification of
a class is denied, class members may choose either to intervene or file their own

35. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983).
36. Id. at 347.
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§
701-716, 78 Stat. 253).
39. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 347-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
40. Id. at 347.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 348.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 353-54.
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suits.48 The Court noted a variety of reasons why a member of a denied class
might wish to file an independent action rather than intervene. First, the class
member might wish to litigate in a forum different from the one chosen by the
named plaintiffs in the original class action.49 Alternatively, the class member
might wish to exercise control over the litigation rather than share it with the
named plaintiffs of the original class action.50 Likewise, class members might
fear that their motions to intervene will be denied on grounds “wholly unrelated
to the merits” of their cases.51
Whatever reasons a plaintiff might have for filing an independent suit rather
than intervening, the Court determined that the essential justifications for class
action tolling carry the same weight in both contexts.52 Without a rule allowing
for the tolling of the statute of limitations, the Court worried that members of
putative classes might feel pressure to preserve their independent causes of
action by filing individual suits for fear that the class would not be certified.53
While “[r]estricting the [tolling] rule [articulated in] American Pipe to
intervenors might reduce the number of individual lawsuits filed against a
particular defendant[,] . . . this decrease in litigation would be counterbalanced
by an increase in protective filings in all class actions.”54 Additionally, the
Court concluded that “although a defendant may prefer not to defend against
multiple actions . . . , this is not an interest that statutes of limitations are
designed to protect.”55

48. Id. at 354.
49. Id. at 350.
50. Id.
51. Id. As the Court explained,
Putative class members frequently are not entitled to intervene as of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and permissive intervention under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) may be denied in the discretion of the District
Court. In exercising its discretion the District Court considers “whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties,” and a court could conclude that undue delay or prejudice would
result if many class members were brought in as plaintiffs upon the denial of class
certification. Thus, permissive intervention may well be an uncertain prospect for
members of a proposed class.
Id. at 350 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)).
52. See id. at 350-53.
53. Id. at 350-51.
54. Id. at 353.
55. Id. Recall that statutes of limitations are designed to promote judicial efficiency and
provide defendants with sufficient notice to protect them from defending stale claims. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
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D. Circuit Courts Confront the Question of Whether Tolling Applies to
Putative Class Members Who File Otherwise Time-Barred Suits Prior to a
Class Certification Ruling
The Supreme Court rulings left open the question whether potential plaintiffs
in a putative class can take advantage of class action tolling if they choose to
file individual suits before certification is confirmed or denied. Initially, the
district and circuit courts that addressed this question ruled that tolling is not
available before the issue of class certification is decided.56 These courts held
that allowing putative class members to file individual suits prior to a denial of
class certification would hinder judicial efficiency by allowing duplicative,
individual suits to be filed while the class action that supplied the potential
justification for tolling was still pending as a class action.57
1. The Initial Circuit Court Decisions Held That Tolling Should Not Apply
to Putative Class Members Who File Individual Suits Prior to a Ruling on
Class Certification
The first circuit court to consider the issue determined that tolling did not
apply to a plaintiff who sought to file an independent suit while class
certification was still pending.58 The First Circuit reasoned that allowing a
plaintiff to file suit prior to a class certification decision would frustrate, rather
56. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2005);
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1983); Puttick v. Am. Online, Inc., No. MDL
1500(SWK), 05 Civ. 5748(SWK), 2007 WL 1522612 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2007); In re Enron
Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Irrer v. Milacron, Inc., No. 04-72898, 2006
WL 2669197 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2006); Kozlowski v. Sheahan, No. Civ.A. 05 C 5593, 2005
WL 3436394 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2005); Calvello v. Elec. Data Sys., No. 00CV800, 2004 WL
941809 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2004); Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 384 F. Supp. 2d 618
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Shaffer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02 C 1774, 2003 WL 22715818
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Chazen v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Ala.
2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 03-11472, 2003 WL 24892029 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003);
In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Prohaska v. Sofamor,
S.N.C., 138 F. Supp. 2d 422 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), amended by 137 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chinn v.
Giant Food, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 331 (D. Md. 2000); Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 793 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Wahad v. City of New York, No. 75 Civ. 6203(AKH), 1999
WL 608772 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1999); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1998 WL 474146 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1998); Stutz v. Minn. Mining
Mfg. Co., 947 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Chemco, Inc. v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, No.
91 C 5041, 1992 WL 188417 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1992); Pulley v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1983); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 461
F. Supp. 999 (D.D.C. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
57. See, e.g., Rahr, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800; see also cases cited supra note 56.
58. See Glater, 712 F.2d at 739.
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than further, the goals of American Pipe.59 Instead of increasing judicial
efficiency and economy, the Court determined that allowing individual suits to
be filed before class certification would lead to a greater number of lawsuits.60
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit found that class action tolling was not available
to an institutional investor who sued PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP for federal
securities fraud.61 Wyser-Pratte Management Company brought suit on June
11, 2002, for claims arising no later than February 23, 1999.62 The plaintiff
argued that the action was timely under a two-year statute of limitations since
a previous class action suit against the defendant had tolled the statute.63 At the
time Wyser-Pratte filed suit, class certification in the earlier suit was still
pending.64
The Sixth Circuit ruled that Wyser-Pratte could not avail itself of the class
action tolling doctrine.65 The court cited the rationale of judicial efficiency and
observed that “[t]he purposes of American Pipe tolling are not furthered when
plaintiffs file independent actions before decision on the issue of class
certification.”66 Once again, the concern was that allowing an individual
plaintiff to file an independent suit prior to a decision on class certification
would lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in filings.67 Moreover, the
Sixth Circuit noted that independent lawsuits filed prior to class certification
“may evaporate once a class has been certified.”68 The court further explained
that “[a]t the point in a litigation when a decision on class certification is made,
[parties] usually are in a far better position to evaluate whether they wish to
proceed with their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if one has been certified.”69

59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 554, 568-69.
62. See id. at 554-55.
63. Id. at 560-61. There were two pending class actions on which Wyser-Pratte sought to
base its argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled as to its claims against
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. See id. at 558. The court ruled that a shareholder class action against
Telxon Corp. did not toll the statute as to a claim against PriceWaterhouseCoopers because
PriceWaterhouseCoopers was not a named defendant in that suit and thus had not been provided
notice by the suit’s filing. See id. at 567-68. Thus, only the shareholder class action against
PriceWaterhouseCoopers was relevant to the question of whether a putative class member could
claim the benefit of tolling prior to a class certification decision. See id. at 568-69.
64. Id. at 560.
65. Id. at 568-69.
66. Id. at 569.
67. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
68. Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569 (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp.
2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007)).
69. Id. (quoting In re WorldCom, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 452).
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A comparison of the First and Sixth Circuit cases reveals that the primary
argument against allowing class action tolling for individual suits filed prior to
class certification centers on judicial efficiency.70 If the purpose of the
American Pipe doctrine is to reduce the number of suits filed in federal courts,
allowing members of a putative class to file individual suits prior to class
certification would achieve the opposite result of that sought by the Court in
American Pipe.71 The Supreme Court provided strong indicators of such a goal
by stating in American Pipe that “efficiency and economy of litigation . . . is a
principal purpose of the [class action] procedure.”72 Nevertheless, recent circuit
court decisions have begun to find that class action tolling should be allowed
for members of a putative class who file suit before class certification, on the
grounds that tolling under such circumstances does not frustrate the goals of
statutes of limitations.73
2. The More Recent Trend in the Federal Circuits Is to Find That Tolling
Does Apply to Putative Class Members Who File Individual Suits Prior to
Class Certification Decisions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first
appellate court to determine that class action tolling could apply to an
individual suit filed by a member of a putative class prior to class certification.74
In the case of In re WorldCom Securities Litigation, the court reasoned that
judicial efficiency was not the purpose of the American Pipe decision—it was
merely “an incidental benefit.”75 Likewise, the court determined that protecting
potential defendants from “multiple actions in multiple forums” was not the
goal of American Pipe.76 According to the Second Circuit, the real purpose of
American Pipe was “to protect class members from being forced to file
individual suits in order to preserve their claims. It was not meant to induce
class members to forgo their right to sue individually.”77 The court found that
because the plaintiffs were represented by the initial filing of the class action,
this filing tolled the statute of limitations for them.78 Moreover, the filing of the
70. Compare id., with Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983).
71. See Glater, 712 F.2d at 739.
72. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
73. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230-35 (10th
Cir. 2008); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Stanton, 129 S. Ct. 762 (2008); In re
WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir. 2007).
74. See In re WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 254-56.
75. Id. at 256.
76. Id. (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353 (1983)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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class action satisfied the primary purpose of the statute of limitations by placing
the defendants on notice of the plaintiffs’ claims.79
In the case of In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, the Ninth
Circuit expressed its agreement with the WorldCom court.80 The court observed
that “[s]tatutes of limitations are intended to provide notice to defendants of a
claim before the underlying evidence becomes stale.”81 Apparently drawing on
the Supreme Court’s description of class actions as representative suits,82 the
Ninth Circuit noted that the “filing of a timely class action provides defendants
with notice of the claim, so a follow-on individual suit cannot surprise
defendants.”83
In extending the class action tolling doctrine to plaintiffs seeking to file
individual actions prior to class certification, the Second and Ninth Circuits
emphasized different considerations than the First and Sixth Circuits. These
courts did not focus solely on the judicial efficiency aspect of statutes of
limitations and class action suits, but emphasized the representative nature of
the actions and the notice provided to defendants.84 The Supreme Court has
identified both of these apparently conflicting goals as purposes behind class
action tolling.85 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff,
the Tenth Circuit would balance these two goals to determine that class action
tolling should be available to plaintiffs filing independent suits prior to class
certification.86
III. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff
A. The Facts
In 1973, the Colorado Legislature enacted the Colorado Auto Accident
Reparations Act (CAARA).87 CAARA mandated that all automobile liability
policies include minimum personal injury protection (PIP) benefits with “time
and dollar” limitations.88 Moreover, CAARA required that all “insurers offer
79. Id. at 255; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
80. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Stanton, 129 S. Ct. 762 (2008).
81. Id.
82. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974); see also supra note 34
and accompanying text.
83. In re Hanford, 534 F.3d at 1009.
84. See id.; see also In re WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 254-56.
85. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350-53 (1983); American Pipe,
414 U.S. at 554-55; see also discussion supra Part II.B-C.
86. See 540 F.3d 1223, 1230-35 (10th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 1224-25 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -726 (2002) (repealed 2003)).
88. Id. at 1225.
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to their policyholders the option of purchasing enhanced PIP benefits.”89
Enhanced PIP benefits did not place time or dollar limitations on medical
expense claims.90 Enhanced PIP benefits also offered expanded coverage for
lost-wage reimbursements.91 “PIP benefits were payable to . . . the person
named . . . in the [insurance] policy, household relatives of the named insured,”
occupants in the insured vehicle with permission of the named policyholder,
and “pedestrians injured in . . . accident[s] involving the insured vehicle.”92
Though PIP benefits were payable to all four classes of injured persons,
CAARA did not specify whether enhanced PIP benefits had to be offered for
all categories.93 Any claims arising under CAARA were subject to a three-year
statute of limitations.94
By 1998, Colorado courts had clarified the contested obligations of insurance
companies under CAARA, ruling that CAARA required insurers to offer
enhanced PIP benefits covering injured persons in all four categories mentioned
in CAARA, rather than just the named insured.95 “[A] slew of litigation”
ensued, initiated by “policyholders . . . and individuals in the other three . . .
categories” covered by policies that had not offered the option of purchasing
enhanced PIP coverage for categories of people other than the named
policyholder.96 These suits sought the retroactive reformation of disputed
policies to provide enhanced coverage instead of the PIP time and dollar
minimums.97
The action upon which Boellstorff’s tolling argument depended was filed in
August 2000, when Ricky Clark brought a class action suit in Colorado state
court against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.98 Mr. Clark
was a pedestrian injured by a driver whose insurance policy had not offered
enhanced PIP benefits for anyone other than the named insured.99 Mr. Clark
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir.
2003)).
91. See id. (citing Clark, 319 F.3d at 1238).
92. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-707).
93. See Clark, 319 F.3d at 1239 (citing Brennan v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 961
P.2d 550, 553-54 (Colo. App. 1998)).
94. Boellstorff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-02192, 2006 WL 2594490,
at *1-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 11, 2006) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-101(1)(j) (2005)), aff’d, 540
F.3d 1223.
95. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1225. The court relied on the 1998 Brennan decision for the
clarification of the obligations of insurance companies under CAARA. See id. (citing Brennan,
961 P.2d at 554).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1225 & n.6.
98. See Clark, 319 F.3d at 1237, cited in Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1226.
99. See id.
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filed “on behalf of all injured persons covered by a State Farm policy who were
not offered and paid extended PIP benefits” under CAARA.100 Clark’s putative
class action suit sought retroactive reformation of Colorado-issued State Farm
policies, including increased PIP benefits payable to people other than the
named insured, in accordance with a Colorado appellate court’s construction of
CAARA.101
In May of 1998, Brian Boellstorff, whose wife would later become a putative
member of the Clark class, bought a State Farm car insurance policy.102 The
policy Mr. Boellstorff purchased included only the required minimum level of
PIP benefits.103 On September 21, 2001, Mr. Boellstorff’s then wife, Leslie
Boellstorff, was involved in an accident while driving Mr. Boellstorff’s insured
Ford Explorer.104 As a result of the accident, Ms. Boellstorff suffered serious
injuries.105 The parties did not dispute that Ms. Boellstorff was covered by the
policy her husband had purchased.106
On September 25, 2001, State Farm sent Ms. Boellstorff a letter that notified
her of the statutorily required minimum level of PIP benefit coverage provided
by her husband’s insurance policy.107 Within a few months of the accident, Ms.
Boellstorff hired a law firm “to represent her in a suit against another driver
involved in [the] accident.”108 There was no dispute that Ms. Boellstorff fit the
description of the putative class described in the Clark class action.109
Nevertheless, on October 31, 2005, Ms. Boellstorff filed an individual claim
against State Farm for alleged violations of CAARA.110 Her complaint
comprised essentially the same allegations set out in the still-pending Clark
class action.111 State Farm argued that the case should be dismissed as untimely
because it was filed more than three years after the accrual of any cause of
action Ms. Boellstorff might have had under CAARA, which provided only a
100. Id. at 1240.
101. See id. at 1240-41 (citing, inter alia, Brennan v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 961
P.2d 550 (Colo. App. 1998)). Though Clark initially filed his class action suit in Colorado state
court, State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. Id. at 1237.
102. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1224, 1228.
103. Id. at 1224.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1227.
108. Id. at 1225.
109. Id. at 1226 & n.7.
110. Id. at 1226.
111. Id. Ms. Boellstorff, like Clark, “sought (1) reformation of the insurance policy to
include enhanced PIP benefits, and (2) damages for alleged breach of contract.” Id.; see also
supra text accompanying note 101.
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three-year statute of limitations.112 Ms. Boellstorff replied that her case
remained timely because the three-year statute of limitations had been tolled by
the filing of the Clark class action.113
B. The District Court Proceedings
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado found that Ms.
Boellstorff’s action had “accrued on September 25, 2001, the date on which
State Farm . . . inform[ed] her of the PIP benefits to which she was entitled.”114
The court therefore found Ms. Boellstorff’s action to be untimely under the
statute of limitations provided by Colorado law.115 Nevertheless, the court
accepted Ms. Boellstorff’s argument that the Clark action—still pending at the
time she filed suit—triggered class action tolling and thereby protected her
claim.116 The district court rejected State Farm’s contention “that [Ms.]
Boellstorff had forfeited the benefits of the . . . [American Pipe] tolling doctrine
by filing her” individual action before a ruling by the Clark court on the
proposed class certification.117 In response, State Farm moved that the question
be certified for appellate review.118 The district court then amended its order to
certify for review the question “whether the opportunity to invoke the class
action toll of American Pipe is lost by a putative class member who commences
an individual action prior to a decision as to class certification.”119
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Ruling on the Certified Question
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on the question whether
American Pipe tolling applied to Ms. Boellstorff’s claim.120 The court found
that the justifications for class action tolling articulated in American Pipe
applied with equal force to Ms. Boellstoff’s situation.121 The court began by
noting that “American Pipe incarnates the principle that the class action is a
representative creature.”122 Therefore, “members of a putative class are treated
as if they were parties to the action itself.”123 The Tenth Circuit also drew
attention to the pragmatic goal of judicial efficiency embodied in the class
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1226-27.
See id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
See id. at 1232-34.
Id. at 1229; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229.
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action tolling doctrine.124 Drawing on the representative nature of class action
suits and the Supreme Court’s efficiency justification for the class action tolling
doctrine, the Tenth Circuit set forth five primary reasons for extending tolling
to members of a putative class who file suit before a decision on class
certification.125
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Reasoning for Extending the Class Action Tolling
Doctrine
First, the Tenth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court’s language in
American Pipe and its progeny supported the extension of tolling to individual
suits filed prior to class certification.126 The Tenth Circuit quoted Crown, Cork
& Seal’s statement that
“[t]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as
a class action.” Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it
remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class
certification is denied.127
In the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, this language did not support the contention that
the denial of class certification is necessary for tolling to take effect.128 Rather,
the court interpreted this language as an explanation of the mechanics of
tolling—the filing of the class action begins the toll, and the denial of class
certification restarts the running of the limitations period.129
Second, the Tenth Circuit observed that a case like Ms. Boellstorff’s is not
properly viewed as one involving tolling per se, but as one in which the action
was timely because Ms. Boellstorff was a party (albeit unnamed) in the initial
Clark action and had thus satisfied the statute of limitations because the class
action was filed before her statutory period elapsed.130 Given that the class
action mechanism is inherently a representative action, “each putative class
member ‘has effectively been a party to an action’ against the defendant ‘since
a class action covering him’ was filed.”131 The Tenth Circuit found this
124. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
125. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1232-34.
126. Id. at 1232.
127. Id. (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (quoting
Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000)).
131. Id. (quoting Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168).
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conclusion reinforced by the fact that the Supreme Court had ruled that tolling
would apply regardless of whether the putative class member had relied on, or
even been aware of, the prior class action to which he was a party.132 Thus, the
court reasoned that Mr. Clark had already effectively “pre-filed” an action
against State Farm on Ms. Boellstorff’s behalf, and she was essentially taking
control of her claim by filing an independent suit.133
Third, the court found that the application of the tolling doctrine to Ms.
Boellstorff’s suit would not frustrate the policy decisions made by the Colorado
Legislature in creating the three-year statute of limitations for CAARA
actions.134 The filing of the Clark class action had already “put State Farm on
notice of the ‘substantive claims being brought against’ it as well as the
‘number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs.’”135 State Farm had
thus already received the benefit of CAARA’s three-year statute of limitations
when the Clark action put it on notice of suit in 2000.136
Fourth, the Tenth Circuit found that “locking putative class members into the
class until the class certification decision . . . could adversely affect” individual
plaintiffs,137 and even frustrate the goal of statutes of limitations by allowing
potential claims to grow more stale.138 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c)(1)(A) requires certification of the putative class “[a]t an early practicable
time.”139 In practice, however, class certification might take years, as illustrated
by the Clark action.140 The court determined that extending tolling to plaintiffs
who wish to file individual actions prior to a class certification ruling would
allow plaintiffs who “deem their own claims valuable enough . . . or decide that
class certification is doubtful” to bring individual suits without potentially
waiting years for a class certification ruling.141 Moreover, the court was
concerned that forcing plaintiffs to wait for a class certification ruling before
filing their individual suits would frustrate the purpose of statutes of limitations

132. See id. at 1233 (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551-52).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007)).
135. Id. (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A)).
140. Id. The Clark action was filed in August 2000, but no motion for class certification was
filed until almost seven years later in May 2007, nearly two years after Ms. Boellstorff brought
her individual claim in October 2005. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 110.
141. Beollstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233 (citing In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
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in guarding against stale claims.142 The longer plaintiffs were forced to wait,
the greater the chance that evidence would grow stale.143
Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the concern that extending class action
tolling to potential members of putative classes before a court ruling on class
certification would result in an increased burden on the courts.144 The court
reasoned that the only class members likely to file individual suits prior to a
class certification decision would be those most likely to opt out of a class even
if certification were granted.145 Thus, the court saw little threat to efficiency in
permitting “litigants with claims valuable enough to pursue” individual actions
to file independent claims before class certification.146 “The courts’ case-load
[would] likely remain the same; the only difference [would be] when those
cases show up on the dockets.”147
Furthermore, the court expressed concern that not extending class action
tolling would have a negative impact on the efficiency of the courts. Potential
plaintiffs would be forced to choose whether to file independent suits before the
untolled limitations period for their individual claims expired.148 Uncertain
about how long class certification might actually take, these plaintiffs might
choose to file “placeholder suits” as a means of preserving their right to sue.149
That practice would increase the burden on the judiciary rather than decrease
it, as the American Pipe doctrine sought to do.150
V. Evaluating the Tenth Circuit’s Reasons for Extending the Class Action
Tolling Doctrine
A close examination of the reasons enumerated by the Tenth Circuit for
extending class action tolling reveals that, though the question is difficult,
American Pipe tolling should be extended to cover independent suits filed prior
to class certification. The Supreme Court’s language in American Pipe and its
progeny is open to multiple interpretations, but the representative nature of class
action suits suggests that the Tenth Circuit was correct to conclude that a class
member’s cause of action is tolled during the time she is a part of the putative
class. This understanding of class action tolling is consonant with the primary
purpose of statutes of limitation—because the defendant is provided with
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1234.
Id.
See id.
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sufficient notice of the individual’s claim—and poses little threat to judicial
efficiency.
A. The Supreme Court’s Language
The Tenth Circuit’s decision to apply American Pipe tolling to plaintiffs who
file individual suits prior to a class certification decision was based in part on
the court’s belief that this practice was supported by Supreme Court language.
Admittedly, however, a close reading of American Pipe and Crown, Cork &
Seal reveals that the Supreme Court’s language can support multiple
interpretations. But contrary to what the Sixth Circuit suggested,151 the
language of American Pipe did not foreclose decisions like the Tenth Circuit’s.
The American Pipe Court found that the statute of limitations was tolled “as to
all asserted members of the class.”152 This language seems to suggest that once
tolling begins with the filing of the class action, the limitations period is tolled
for all class members.
The entire sentence, however, stated that tolling was applicable “to all
asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been
permitted to continue as a class action.”153 This language could be interpreted,
as it was by the Sixth Circuit, as standing for the proposition that tolling is not
available to members of the asserted class until there is a denial of class
certification.154 As a result, the Court’s language could be construed as not
supporting the extension of tolling to putative class members who choose to
pursue independent litigation before class certification when there is no
indication that the initial class action will not be permitted to continue as a class
action.
The language of Crown, Cork & Seal can give rise to the same kind of
interpretive battle. Crown, Cork & Seal held that “[o]nce the statute of
limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative
class until class certification is denied.”155 Again, this may be read as support
for the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation that tolling begins for all class members
with the filing of the class action and ends upon the denial of class certification.
Even a court that held that tolling should not be extended to individual suits
prior to class certification once found that this language supports the reasoning
later articulated by the Tenth Circuit.156
151. See Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2005).
152. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (emphasis added).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569.
155. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).
156. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1998 WL 474146, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1998).
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But the Supreme Court followed this inclusive statement by noting that “[a]t
that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as
plaintiffs in the pending action.”157 This statement may easily be read to
support the contention that class members must wait until class certification is
denied before filing independent suits. Therefore, it is doubtful that Crown,
Cork & Seal’s language is quite as “clear” as the Tenth Circuit claimed,158 but
it does not absolutely foreclose the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation either.
B. The Representative Nature of the Class Action Suit
The Tenth Circuit’s second reason for extending American Pipe tolling is
more persuasive. In considering the representative nature of the class action
suit, the court observed that a putative member of a class has effectively filed
an action with the commencement of the class action and has therefore been a
party to the suit all along.159 The Supreme Court noted in American Pipe that
the class action was initially designed as “an invitation to joinder” extended to
potential class members.160 This design led to abuses, however, in that it
allowed class members “in some situations [to] await developments in the trial
or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation
[in the class action] would be favorable to their interests.”161 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 was amended in part to rectify this problem.162 In its current
form, Rule 23 makes the final judgment in any class action binding on all
members of the class who have not requested exclusion from the class.163
Judgments are binding on all class members whether or not they have been
provided notice of the action.164
157. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added).
158. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir.
2008).
159. See id. at 1232-33.
160. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1974).
161. Id. at 547.
162. Id.
163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). Only members of a class certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) have the option to request exclusion from the class after the class is
certified. See id. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). If members of a 23(b)(3) class do not request exclusion, the
judgment in the action will bind them. See id. 23(c)(3)(B). For classes certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), once the class is certified, judgment in the action
will be binding on all members. See id. 23(c)(3)(A).
164. See id. 23(c)(3). There is no requirement that members receive notice of an action
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2). For these types of classes,
whether notice should be provided to members and the form it should take if it is provided are
left to the discretion of the judge. Id. 23(c)(2)(A). For members of a class certified under Rule
23(b)(3), the rule calls for the court to order the “best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances.” Id. 23(c)(2)(B).
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The Court concluded that these changes mean that a class action is “no
longer ‘an invitation to joinder’ but a truly representative suit.”165 This
representative nature of the class action suit has been integral to the Court’s
development of the tolling doctrine. Because a class action is representative,
“the commencement of [a class] action satisfie[s] the purpose of the limitation
provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit.”166
Class members are not required to rely on or have knowledge of the class action
proceeding before the commencement of the suit to satisfy the purpose of the
statute of limitations.167
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning fits well with the Supreme Court’s
observations on the nature of the class action suit. Given that members of a
class are bound by the judgment in an action unless they opt to be excluded
from the class,168 and that they stand “as parties to the suit until and unless they
receive[] notice thereof and [choose] not to continue,”169 it would be an odd rule
that would find their burden of filing within the statute of limitations unmet by
the filing of the class action.
C. Class Action Suits and Notice to Defendants
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a relationship between the
representative nature of the class action suit and the requirement that defendants
receive notice of pending litigation.170 As the Tenth Circuit correctly noted,
when the underlying Clark class action was filed, State Farm was put “on notice
of the ‘substantive claims being brought against’ it as well as the ‘number and
generic identities of the potential plaintiffs.’”171 When the Clark class action
against State Farm was filed, State Farm could not have known that Ms.
Boellstorff specifically would be a party to the suit, but it should have been able
to foresee that many similarly situated plaintiffs would assert claims. Thus,
State Farm was in a position to start gathering the evidence required for

165. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550.
166. Id. at 551.
167. See id. at 552.
168. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); see also supra note 163.
169. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
170. See id. at 554-55.
171. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555); see also supra text accompanying note 135. Recall
that notice to defendants is the primary purpose of statutes of limitations. See Burnett v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); see also supra text accompanying note 14.
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preparing its defense.172 It had therefore already been provided the benefit of
the statute of limitations set by the Colorado Legislature.173
D. Adverse Effects of Nontolling on Plaintiffs and Increased Chances of
Stale Evidence
The Tenth Circuit found further support for extending the class action tolling
doctrine by considering the adverse effects that nonextension would have on
both plaintiffs and defendants. The Tenth Circuit noted that “locking . . . class
members into the class” action suit until a certification decision could force
plaintiffs to wait years before obtaining the relief they seek.174 As the court
pointed out, seven years had passed between the filing of the Clark action and
the filing of the motion for class certification.175 Often, in fact, the “time
between the commencement of a class action to its certification can be
indefinite.”176 Moreover, forcing class members to await a certification
decision would make plaintiffs “dependent on the pace set by attorneys and the
[c]ourt[s] alike.”177 While American Pipe couched its justification for class
action tolling largely in terms of judicial efficiency and the avoidance of
duplicative suits,178 the purpose of American Pipe, as the Second Circuit
observed, was not to force “class members to forgo their right to sue
individually.”179
Declining to extend the tolling doctrine appears even more problematic in
light of the detrimental effects on defendants of requiring plaintiffs to wait for
a decision on class certification before filing an independent suit.180 One
purpose of statutes of limitations is to ensure that defendants do not have to
defend against stale claims, where there is a risk that evidence will have been
lost.181 Requiring plaintiffs to wait until a class certification decision has been
rendered, which could take years, would only increase the danger that claims
and evidence would become stale.182

172. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Id.; see also supra note 140.
176. Mason v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. 07 C 6545, 2008 WL 4951228, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 2008).
177. Id.
178. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-54 (1974); see also supra text
accompanying notes 31-32.
179. See In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d Cir. 2007).
180. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233.
181. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
182. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233.
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E. The Effect of Extending Class Action Tolling on Judicial Efficiency
The primary argument against extending class action tolling to members of
a putative class prior to a certification ruling is that doing so would frustrate the
principal purpose of tolling and lead to an increase in the number of duplicative
suits.183 This argument is not without force. The Supreme Court originally
justified the class action tolling doctrine as a means of encouraging judicial
efficiency by discouraging the filing of duplicative motions to protect class
members’ future rights to file independent suits.184 It should be noted that the
number of courts that have been required to address the extension of tolling to
class members who file suit prior to class certification is itself evidence that an
extension of the doctrine will lead to the filing of some duplicative suits.185
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are reasons why
class members might wish to file independent lawsuits rather than participate
in the class action.186 The Court expressed concern that restricting class action
tolling to just those class members who want to intervene in the action would
create an incentive for class members wishing to pursue individual actions to
file protective placeholder suits before the running of the statute of
limitations.187 The same concern would exist if tolling were only available to
members of a class after a class certification decision. Putative class members
might seek to file independent suits in order to preemptively protect their claims
in the event they later become dissatisfied with how the class action suit is
progressing. The Tenth Circuit’s extension of the tolling doctrine thus seems
in step with the Court’s reasoning in Crown, Cork & Seal.
The Tenth Circuit was also correct to draw attention to the fact that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 already allows members of a class to seek exclusion
183. See discussion supra Part II.D.1. While the circuits that have declined to apply tolling
to class members who choose to file independent suits prior to a class certification decision have
identified judicial efficiency as the primary purpose of tolling, see, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt.
Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 569 (6th Cir. 2005), this is only a secondary purpose of
statutes of limitations. See discussion supra Part II.A. The primary purpose of statutes of
limitations, as discussed above, is providing notice to defendants of litigation in order to relieve
them of the burden of defending against stale claims. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.
424, 428 (1965); Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49; see also supra text
accompanying note 14.
184. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 (1983) (citing Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)).
185. See, e.g., Folks v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F. App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2008);
Mason v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. 07 C 6545, 2008 WL 4951228 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18,
2008); see also cases cited supra note 56.
186. See Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350.
187. See id. at 350-51.
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from the class, or opt out, after class certification.188 The court claimed that any
increase in duplicative suits filed under an extended tolling doctrine would thus
be offset, because those same litigants filing duplicative suits would choose to
opt out of the class after certification anyway.189 Moreover, statistical studies
show that few class members choose to opt out of class litigation.190
If the Tenth Circuit is correct—that those who would file independent suits
are the same class members who would opt out of certified classes
anyhow—then the goal of judicial efficiency is only minimally served by
restricting tolling to those who wait for class certification. There are two
reasons for this. First, only a small percentage of putative class members would
choose to file independent suits before class certification but after their statutes
of limitations had run. Second, a restriction on tolling would merely remove
suits from dockets today and delay them until a later time.
VI. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit’s Boellstorff decision adds to the growing number of cases
holding that class action tolling should apply to all members of a putative class,
regardless of whether a certification ruling has been made. Though there is a
reasonable fear that this practice might increase the amount of litigation filed
in federal courts, it is very likely that any increase will be offset, given that the
types of litigants who file individual suits before a certification decision would
otherwise elect to opt out of the class after certification if they were forced to

188. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1233 (citing Jahn ex
rel. Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 989 (Colo. 2004)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); see also
supra note 163.
189. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233-34.
190. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532
(2004). It should be noted that opting out of a class after certification is only allowed to
members of classes certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2)(B)(v); see also supra note 163. The rule fashioned by the Tenth Circuit, however,
would not restrict tolling only to classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3). But the court’s use of
the word “valuable” to describe the claims of those who might elect to opt out indicates that it
foresees the tolling doctrine being most attractive to members of putative class actions being
pursued under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) classification. See Boellstorff, 540
F.3d at 1233; see also supra text accompanying note 146. The likelihood of this conclusion is
reinforced by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999),
which noted potential constitutional concerns in the certification of a class that does not allow
for opting out where significant, individualized monetary damages are sought. See id. at 84548. Thus, any putative class member who is seeking to file an independent suit prior to a class
certification decision and who is a member of a class seeking certification as a non-opt-out class
is likely a member of a putative class headed for eventual certification denial already.
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wait. The extension of American Pipe in this manner is still consistent with the
Supreme Court’s past language. And because the representative nature of class
actions means that defendants are put on notice of pending litigation with the
filing of a class action, allowing class members to file individual suits prior to
class certification does defendants little damage.
Moreover, the length of time that can pass between the initiation of a class
action and class certification can often mean that potential plaintiffs must wait
for years before they see justice done. This same passage of time can actually
frustrate the purposes of statutes of limitations by allowing claims to become
stale. By extending the tolling doctrine, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Boellstorff helps mitigate both of these concerns. The Supreme Court has yet
to consider the issue, but the growing trend among the circuit courts of appeals
seems to suggest that an extension of tolling to cover class members who file
independent suits prior to certification will become the law of the majority of
jurisdictions.
Caleb Brown
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